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REPORT TO THE CITY COUNCIL BY THE CITY INTERNAL AUDITOR

AUDIT OF THE
SHREVEPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
(OSI)

INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT
(IAR) 060315-01

May 21, 2015

Report Highlights	Page
• There is a need for improvement in communication between Detectives and Supervisors within the Office of Special Investigations	5
• There are serious deficiencies in access controls over the Department's computer system and database	8



The Council
City of Shreveport

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May 21, 2015

Councilman Jeff Everson
Chairman, Shreveport City Council

Dear Councilman Everson:

Subject: IAR 060315-01 – Audit of the Shreveport Police Department - Office of Special Investigations (OSI)

Attached please find the report mentioned above. Management comments are included in the report.

Sincerely,

Leanis L. Steward, CPA, CIA
City Internal Auditor

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
AUDIT OF THE SHREVEPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS (OSI)
INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT (IAR) 060315-01

The purpose of the executive summary is to convey in capsule form the significant issues of the audit report. The executive summary is a vehicle for reviewing the report and should only be used in conjunction with the entire report.

INTRODUCTION

We performed this audit to ascertain the effectiveness and efficiency of the Office of Special Investigations and its adherence to applicable laws and regulations. It included review of the General Orders (policies and procedures) of the Shreveport Police Department (SPD) in effect over the operations and activities of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and an evaluation of the effectiveness of these and other controls over the performance of the OSI.

RECOMMENDATION EVALUATION RISK CRITERIA

The chart below summarizes the recommendations outlined in the report and our evaluation of risk for the recommendations. We evaluated the importance of each audit recommendation by assigning each a level of risk. The risk levels, as defined in the chart below, were determined based on the possible results for the entity if the recommendation is not implemented. This report contains six findings with ten recommendations.

<i>Risk Levels</i>	<i>Recommendations</i>
<p style="text-align: center;">High Risk</p> <p>Possibility of fraud, waste, and abuse of City assets; Interrupted and/or disrupted operations; Entity's mission not being met; Adverse publicity.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Detectives communicate with lieutenants about specific circumstances and time frame of scheduled cases. (Finding 1) ➤ The reviewing officer follows up to ensure a report has been submitted for each case placed on the arrest log. (Finding 1) ➤ Arresting officers be instructed to submit a Subject Management Report (SMR) for each arrest. (Finding 2) ➤ Supervising officers ensure the presence of the SMR in their review of each arrest report. (Finding 2) ➤ Data entry personnel withhold entry of the report into the Department's RMS database until it is complete, including signature and badge number of supervisor. (Finding 3) ➤ Correct the deficiencies in access controls and errors in the list of authorized users. (Finding 4) ➤ Develop and implement policies and procedures defining and giving guidance on use of adequate Information Technology access and system controls. (Finding 4) ➤ Follow procedure for reporting the seizure of and submitting evidence to Property Room. (Finding 5)
<p style="text-align: center;">Medium Risk</p> <p>Possibility of continuing, significant operating inefficiencies and high-level non-compliance issues.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ City Ordinance 10-44 (1) should be revised to include measurable standards of "good character and reputation." (Finding 6)
<p style="text-align: center;">Low Risk</p> <p>Possibility of continuing operating inefficiencies and some low-level non-compliance issues.</p>	<p>None</p>

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FINDINGS

Risk Factor

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**AUDIT OF THE SHREVEPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS (OSI)
INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT (IAR) 060315-01**

OBJECTIVES

We have completed an audit of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) within the Shreveport Police Department (SPD) for the calendar year 2013. The objective of our audit was to determine whether the OSI is operating efficiently and effectively.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of the audit was to determine whether the OSI is operating efficiently and effectively. The scope of our audit included the year 2013. Audit procedures included, but were not limited to:

Evaluation of Arrest Reports

- Articulation of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to arrest
- Articulation of search and seizure
- Admonition of Miranda Rights

Evaluation of search/arrest warrant packages

- Magistrate approval of the search/Arrest Warrant
- Completeness of the warrant Tracking Log
- Supervisor approval of search Warrant Package
- Completion of Required Employee Reports
- Adherence to other significant policies and procedures

Standards Based Assessments

- Record of passing required exam(s)
- Officer evaluations current

Evaluations of Informants

- Accounting for funds used to pay Informants

Collecting Evidence

- Documentation of evidence log in
- Documentation that inventory is performed


The scope of our audit included a review of the General Orders (policies and procedures) in effect over the activities and operations of the OSI and an evaluation of the effectiveness of these and other controls, as well as the completeness and accuracy of the reporting of the activities and operations. Our scope also included an evaluation of compliance with applicable laws, ordinances and regulations governing the OSI.

We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, except that a peer review has not been performed, and included such tests of procedures and controls as considered appropriate. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings, conclusions and recommendations based on our audit objectives.



BACKGROUND

The OSI is comprised of three units: Narcotics, Vice, and Intelligence. These units are assigned to investigate incidents of narcotics trafficking, street corner narcotics sales, seizure of drugs (see chart to the right) and assets, vice offenses (gambling, prostitution, and illegal alcohol sales), and gang activity. The combined Caddo-Shreveport Narcotics Task Force is operated as an integral part of OSI. OSI also contains specialized units such as the Street Level Interdiction, Mid-Level Interdiction, Special Response Team, and Criminal Intelligence. Other duties of OSI personnel include assignment to federal task forces such as the ATF, DEA, FBI Violent Crimes, and USMS (US Marshals Service).



SOURCE: SPD 2014 ANNUAL CRIME REPORT

CONCLUSIONS/FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS

The Internal Audit Office expresses appreciation to the management and personnel of the Shreveport Police Department and its Office of Special Investigations for their cooperation and assistance provided during our audit. We found the Chief and the officers within the OSI knowledgeable and dedicated to their assignments and to the safety and protection of the community.

Based on our review, we believe management could enhance the efficiency and control environment by addressing the following concerns:

- Instruct Detectives to communicate with Lieutenants about the specific circumstances and time frames of cases that are scheduled.
- Once a case is placed on the arrest log, the reviewing officer should follow up and ensure that a report has been submitted.
- Arresting officers include a Subject Management Report (SMR) for every arrest.
- Supervising officers include the presence of the SMR in their review of each arrest report.



- Data entry personnel return incomplete reports to the issuing officer and withhold entry of the report into the Department's RMS (Report Management System) until it is complete, including a supervisor signature and badge number.
- Department management take steps immediately to correct the deficiencies in access controls and bring the list of authorized users and their permissions up to date.
- Department management develop and implement policies and procedures mandating the use of adequate controls and defining the minimum acceptable controls that meet the definition of "adequate controls".
- City Ordinance 10-44 - *Qualifications of Applicant* - (1) should be revised to include measurable standards.
- Follow General Order procedures for reporting and submitting evidence to Property Room. Designate administrative personnel to compare evidence submissions to Property Room receipt records.

1. Reports Not Submitted

Criteria: General Order Procedure requires that a completed offense report with reporting officer information, legal name and demographic information about offender and a narrative of the events that led to the officer making contact with the offender be submitted to supervising officer for review at the end of each shift.

Condition: Of the sample of 294 narcotics reports selected for review, initially, six could not be located. After informing narcotics detectives of the missing reports, two were found and submitted for review. The remaining four were not submitted for review by detectives at the conclusion of audit fieldwork, although several detectives stated that they had the reports on their flash drives. One officer advised that a report had not been submitted because it was an ongoing investigation, which is contrary to SPD guidelines that reports of ongoing investigations are to be submitted for review at the end of the shift and updated as the case progresses.

Employees shall promptly submit such reports as are required by the performance of their duties or by constituted authority. "Promptly" shall be construed to mean the end of the respective shift or tour of duty. Bureau Captains may authorize the holding of a report for a period exceeding the above time limit, where conditions warrant a delay.

SPD 100.56

Effect: Arrests were made where there are no reports of the incidents that led to the arrest. Progress of ongoing investigation are not submitted and updated in a timely manner.

Cause: The level of compliance exhibited here indicates a less than acceptable degree of communication between detectives and supervisors resulting in inadequate accountability.




Recommendation: Detectives should communicate with lieutenants and submit reports about the specific circumstances and time frame of cases that are scheduled and/or ongoing. Once a case is placed on the arrest log, the reviewing officer should follow up that a report has been submitted.

Management Response: Division command has ordered all reports to be submitted to the appropriate supervisors prior to the end of each agent's tour of duty every shift barring some sort of exigent circumstance pursuant to SPD 100.56. The six reports not found initially during the audit have been located, submitted and entered into RMS.

2. Subject Management Report

Criteria: SPD General Procedure 601.10 Use of Force

A. It shall be the policy of the Shreveport Police Department that police officers use only the level of force that is objectively reasonable to accomplish lawful objectives while detaining, arresting, self-defense, defense of others, defense of property, prevent person from injuring themselves, or prevent person from destroying evidence.



B. Officers have the responsibility of providing the facts and circumstances they believe justified the Use of Force technique or method used by completing the necessary reports, memos, etc.

C. Reporting Use of Force - Members will document the use of each response option as outlined below.

1. General Reporting Guidelines - Officers will document the use of each response option in an offense/supplement report as required by SPD 401.01. Officers involved will notify a supervisor as soon as possible in all instances of the application of Use of Force techniques except presence, verbal persuasion, soft empty hand and the routine use of restraints.
2. Each officer participating in the application of Use of Force when techniques other than presence, verbal persuasion, or the use of routine restraints, whether an arrest occurs or not, shall submit a Subject Management Report and the appropriate offense/narrative supplemental report.

Condition: Based on SPD 601.10, two narcotics arrest reports we reviewed should have included a complete Subject Management Report (SMR) reviewed and signed by a supervisor. The Subject Management Report provides details of any use of force beyond officer presence and verbal persuasion applied by officer(s) to effect the arrest or restraint of the subject. It includes a description of any injuries or medical treatment consequential to the use of force.



- One of the arrest reports did not include an SMR. In this report, the narcotics officer included in his offense report his account of using physical force to keep a suspect from causing injury or harm to himself.
- The other arrest report did include the SMR, however, the SMR was not signed by a supervisor. The officer describes a similar incident in which he used physical force to keep a suspect from destroying evidence.

Both of these arrest reports were signed/approved by the same supervisor.

Effect: Although both reports give narrative of incidents occurring that involve use of force, without the SMR form there is no documentation that use of force is reviewed and approved or disapproved.

Cause: Officers are not using the SMR form each time it is required. Supervisors are not including the SMR form as part of their review process every time use of force beyond verbal persuasion and routine arrests restraints occur.

Recommendation: Every officer should be required to include an SMR form any time an arrest is made in addition to when use of force beyond verbal persuasion and routine restraints is applied. Supervising officers include the SMR in their report review process.

Management Response: As per recent changes to SPD 601.10 pertaining to the completion of subject management reports, division command has ordered agents to complete and submit a subject management report with all arrest reports. The appropriate supervisor will review and sign to ensure compliance.

3. Incomplete Report Information

Criteria: SPD General Procedure 404.01 Supervisory Documentation

A. General Requirements:

1. The primary dispatched officer, or officer initiating a call for service, shall be responsible for completing the initial report and submitting the report to a supervisor at the end of their shift or tour of duty. Commanding officers (Captain or higher rank) may authorize holding a report for a period exceeding this time limit when circumstances or conditions warrant a delay.
- 2.-6....Not included here as these paragraphs are not pertinent to this finding.
7. Unless approved by the commander, the report should be completed and submitted to a supervisor, prior to the end of the shift.
8. A supervisor shall approve written offense/incident reports or computer generated entry of a report to verify accuracy and completeness.



B. Supervisor Requirements:

1. The supervisor will read the report to determine that it meets all the previously listed requirements and the correct Louisiana Revised Statute is entered in the report.
 - a. If the report does not conform to all requirements, or the Louisiana Revised Statute is incorrect, the supervisor shall have the officer correct the report immediately.
 - b. When the report meets all requirements, the supervisor shall affix his/her signature and badge number to the space(s) provided and forward the report to the Report Review Officer.

ONE
PROSTITUTION
REPORT AND
EIGHT
NARCOTICS
REPORTS DID
NOT HAVE A
SUPERVISOR
SIGNATURE AND
BADGE NUMBER

Condition: Out of the 403 combined narcotics, prostitution, and ABO (Alcoholic Beverage Ordinance) reports selected for review, there were nine reports that did not have a supervisor signature and badge number.

Effect: Reports are entered into the Report Management System without supervisory approval for accuracy and completeness.

Cause: Supervisors are not following guidelines of the report review process.

Recommendation: Data entry personnel return incomplete reports to issuing officer and withhold entry of the report into the Department's RMS (Report Management System) until it is complete, including a supervisor signature and badge number.

Management Response: Division command has ordered all supervisors to be cognizant of their responsibilities to review and sign off on reports submitted by subordinates.

4. Computer Access and Other Information Technology Deficiencies

Criteria: Information maintained in the Department's computer database is sensitive and should be adequately protected from unauthorized access, modification or deletion. Records of active authorized users and their access rights should be complete and up to date.

Condition: We found serious deficiencies in the controls over user access. These deficiencies have been disclosed to management in detail, but are not detailed in this report in order to preclude disclosure of details prejudicial to the integrity of the system. We also found that the list of active users with access to OSI data contained the names and permissions of 19 inactive users, but did not contain the names of at least four active users and their permissions.



Effect: Inadequate computer access controls provide opportunities for unauthorized persons to acquire, modify, or delete information from the database. Failure to maintain current lists of authorized persons having access to the system could lead to confusion and the granting of access to unauthorized persons.

Inadequate computer access controls provide opportunities for unauthorized persons to acquire, modify, or delete information from the database.

Cause: Failure to understand the operation of computer access controls and their importance in protecting the integrity of the database.

Recommendation: Department management should take steps immediately to correct the deficiencies in computer access controls and bring the list of authorized users and their permissions up to date. Additionally, the Department management should develop and implement policies and procedures for the use of adequate computer access controls and defining the minimum acceptable controls that meet the definition of “adequate controls”.

Management Response: The list of authorized users has been updated and is current. The department’s TAC coordinator had been, prior to this audit, working with department’s systems administrator and officials at the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections to implement minimum acceptable controls as per state regulations and that task has been accomplished. The Planning and Research Unit is currently researching the viability of drafting a policy directive to clearly delineate the responsibility of divisional commanders to maintain and update any lists of authorized users.

5. Chain of Custody Documentation and Submission Procedures

Criteria: SPD General Procedure 502-01 Evidence/Property Operation

VIII. SUBMISSION:

- A. “Members booking evidence or property into the Property Room will submit all proper documents with the item.”

Condition: We tested 23 reports to determine if the items seized during arrests were properly submitted to the Police Property Room. We determined that there were three instances where there was no indication that all of the evidence seized was submitted to the Property Room.



(Auditors Note: The Property Room has no record of the items being placed into their inventory for one of those instances.)

Effect: There is a strong possibility that crucial evidence is misplaced.

The Property Management Unit will only accept the evidence after all corrections have been made and the proper paperwork submitted.

SPD 502.01

Cause: Based on the policy, neither the arresting officer nor the supervisor followed the guidelines set forth in SPD Procedure 502.01 Evidence/Property Operations.

Recommendation: All OSI officers should follow General Order procedures for reporting and submitting evidence to Property Room. OSI should designate administrative personnel to compare evidence submissions to Property Room receipt records, in addition to Desk Sergeant and Shift Commander.

Management Response: In each of the three incidents noted, further investigation by supervisors determined all evidence connected to those cases was indeed submitted to and maintained by the department's Property Management Unit. The only item in question was a SIM card that may not have been transferred from the old computer system to the new.

6. Undefined Standard for Alcoholic Beverage Permits

Criteria: City of Shreveport Ordinance *Section 10-44 – Qualification of Applicant* – states that qualifications of applicant for alcoholic beverage permits of all kinds shall meet the following qualifications and conditions: (1) is a person of good character and reputation and 21 years of age or older.

Condition: While the other criteria listed in the ordinance have specific meaning and standards, "Good character and reputation" does not define a standard in any measureable terms.

Effect: The determination of "good character and reputation" is left to the discretion of individuals and may lead to bias or discrimination when approving and denying applications for Alcoholic Beverage Ordinance (ABO) permits.

Cause: This criterion for applicant qualification is undefined and vague.

Recommendation: The Ordinance should be revised to include a measurable definition for "good character and reputation" or this standard should be stricken from the ordinance.

Management Response: The department's ABO officer is working with officials from the City Attorney's Office to review the verbiage contained in City Ordinance Section 10-44. Any changes would be, obviously, pending a final review and vote by the Shreveport City Council.



Prepared by:

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Approved by:

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Leanis L. Steward, CPA, CIA
City Internal Auditor

aj:bh:nd

- c: City Council
- Clerk of Council
- Mayor
- Chief of Police
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Chief Administrative Assistant (SPD)
- BKD